A variety of findings suggest that when conducting visual search, we can exploit cues that are statistically related to a target's location. But is this the result of heuristic mechanisms or an internal model that tracks the statistics of the environment? Here, connections are made between the two explanations, and four models are assessed to probe the mechanisms underlying prediction in search. Participants conducted a simple gaze-contingent search task with five conditions, each of which consists of different combinations of 1st and 2nd order statistics. People's exploration behaviour adapted to the statistical rules governing target behaviour. Behaviour was most consistent with a model that represents transitions from one location to another, and that makes the underlying assumption that the world is dynamic. This assumption that the world is changeable could not be overridden despite task instruction and nearly 1 h of exposure to unchanging statistics. This means that while people may be suboptimal in some experimental contexts, it may be because their internal mental model makes assumptions that are adaptive in a complex, changeable world.
Introduction
When we conduct visual search we can use at least two classes of information: presently available visual cues, and predictions based upon the past. While we may rely upon both factors in real-world search, this study focusses upon the predictive mechanisms underlying saccadic targeting. It is clear that memory of the past can influence search in a variety of ways (see reviews by Shore and Klein (2000) , Woodman and Chun (2006) , and Fecteau and Munoz (2003) ). One notable example is seen in contextual cuing: when a target's location is predictable given particular arrangement of simple distracter shapes, seeing that distracter context again leads to lower search times (Chun & Jiang, 1998 ) through more accurate saccadic targeting (Peterson & Kramer, 2001 ). Similar spatial expectations can be elicited by pictures of natural scenes (Eckstein, Drescher, & Shimozaki, 2006; Neider & Zelinsky, 2006; Torralba et al., 2006) .
Saccade latencies also provide insight into saccadic planning: in temporal evidence accumulation approaches such as the LATER model (Carpenter & Williams, 1995) , shorter saccade latencies could be due (among other things) to an increased prior expectation about a target's location. Carpenter and Williams (1995) and Carpenter (2004) found that when a target had a spatial bias to appear in one location more often than another, saccadic latencies were reduced to the high probability location. This was explained as changes in initial activation levels of each location, in other words, past experience of a target's previous spatial locations contributed to a prediction of where the next target would occur.
But can these internal predictions be combined with ambiguous visual cues of a target's location? Liston and Stone (2008) used a saccadic choice task where subjects tried to fixate a luminancedefined target where the probability of the target being on the left or right of fixation was manipulated. Oculometric functions showed that as the visual discriminability decreased, there was an increased chance to fixate the high probability location. This study was notable for showing that saccadic decisions were the outcome of combining internal spatial predictions with visual evidence.
These saccadic latency and choice experiments suggest that the occulomotor system can track (or at least receives input from a system that can) target location statistics, also termed a spatial bias or 1st order statistics. However, the ability to learn spatial biases has been questioned in other experimental paradigms. Because target location repetitions are more likely to occur in high probability regions, a bias to attend the previous target location (an effect dubbed transient facilitation, or location priming) could perhaps account for apparent learning of spatial biases (Shore & Klein, 2000; Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006) . In one experiment, Walthew and Gilchrist (2006) sought evidence that we could learn a spatial bias if the location repetition confound was removed. If we could, then search should have been facilitated in high probability regions even if location repeats never occurred. While they did not discount a role for statistical learning in overt search, their data did not support any spatial bias learning effect above and beyond that caused by transient facilitation.
Recent work suggests that we can in fact learn spatial biases. Druker and Anderson (2010) drew targets from a continuous distribution across the screen, rather than a few discreet locations: this afforded a strong spatial bias but a near-zero chance of location repetitions on consecutive trials. The found that a chromatic discrimination task was faster in high probability regions and concluded that we can learn and utilise spatial probabilities governing a target's location. Jones and Kaschak (2012) addressed some methodological concerns of the experiments by Walthew and Gilchrist (2006) and in a modified replication, they showed that first saccades were directed more often to a high probability side of the display, even in the absence of location repeats.
If 1st order statistics define the probability of where a target occurs in space, 2nd order statistics describe this spatial probability, but dependent upon the previous target location. As such, they statistically describe how targets move over time, how they transition from one location to another. Nummela, Lovejoy, and Krauzlis (2008) used a Markov model to probabilistically determine a rewarded location, contingent upon the previous rewarded location. People's saccades were directed to each location roughly in proportion to the probability that a location would be rewarded, despite no visual cues being available indicating that they had learnt these 2nd order trial-to-trial contingencies to a certain degree. There is also evidence from within-trial saccadic targeting that 2nd order statistics can be learnt. Farrell et al. (2009) showed within-trial inhibition of return is abolished by manipulating the environmental statistics to make location repetitions more likely. Within a temporal evidence accumulation approach, they found evidence that changing the environmental statistics caused changes in threshold activation: in their model this was indistinguishable from altered baseline activations, i.e. prior expectations adapted to the environmental statistics.
If people's internal model of the world only represents spatial locations, then they should be capable of learning 1st order statistics. However, to learn the 2nd order statistics of how targets move over time would require a more complex internal representation that can encode transition probabilities. The first aim of this work is to examine whether we can learn these 1st or 2nd order statistics, which in turn allows us to infer the nature of the internal predictive model (see Fig. 1 ). While there is a suggestion that we learn 1st and 2nd order statistics simultaneously (also see Wilder, Jones, & Mozer, 2009; Yu & Cohen, 2009) , these are investigated separately here.
A second aim of this work is to examine the mechanism underlying how we update our predictive model based on past experience. One pertinent model was proposed by Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) who examined location priming in a visual discrimination task. Reaction time benefits were seen on trials where the target repeated its location. Because these transient facilitatory effects persisted over the experiment despite not being beneficial, Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) concluded that they were caused by a robust mechanism that must be beneficial in other more typical situations. They proposed a resistor-capacitor circuit model where the activity of a unit increases every time a target occurs at the corresponding location, but all activity decays over time.
It is worth noting that the resistor-capacitor model proposed by Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) bears remarkable similarity to a leaky integration model proposed by Anderson and Carpenter (2006) . They examined how prior expectations in saccadic choice are updated based upon past experiences. By changing the spatial probabilities at a particular point during a block of trials, saccade latencies were observed to change according to the new spatial position bias. The time-course of this change indicated the rate (k) at which old observations of spatial bias were overturned in favour of more recent observations. If the real spatial probabilities are defined by p, then their leaky-integrator model estimated these with a set of activities q with the following update equation:
Here, I is a vector of inputs which increased unit activity by 0 (at distracter locations) or 1 (at target locations). This update equation is a rational way to update beliefs if one assumes the world is dynamic, that is, that there is a belief that the probabilities governing a target's location change (see Anderson & Carpenter, 2006) . This can be compared to the very similar update equation of a resistor-capacitor circuit proposed by Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) ,
One important difference with this equation is that if k = 0 then no information about the past is discarded and the model amounts to keeping a running frequency count of where targets occur in the past, this in turn would cause q to be the maximum likelihood estimate of p (Anderson & Goodman, 1957) . Eq. (2) with k = 0 would be an optimal way of updating beliefs if the world was static, where target behaviours do not change over time.
To summarise, the second aim of this work is to examine whether people assume the world is static or dynamic. This is important because if the world is static, then maintaining the assumption that the world is dynamic would lead to a sub-optimal use of observations. This is simply because estimates of long run relative frequencies are being made from a smaller sample. As well as examining if people can learn 1st and 2nd order statistics, this work assesses people's assumptions about living whether they are observing a static world (Eq. (2), with k = 0) or dynamic world (Eq. (1), where k is a free parameter).
Experiment 1 answers these questions by comparing search behaviour of four models (see Fig. 1 ) that can either represent spatial locations (a 1st order model) or transitions (a 2nd order model). Additionally, both types of models are tested with the assumption that the environmental statistics are static, or dynamic. Five different search conditions are used in order to see which model provides the most robust account of people's occulomotor search behaviour over a range of different sets of environmental statistics. Experiment 2 exposed people to nearly 1 h of Fig. 1 . Conceptual overview of prediction in search with the four models examined. Spatial biases could be learnt with a simple level of activity for each spatial location (4 in this case). Representing movement over time requires a representation of 4 Â 4 units to represent all possible transitions. This is schematically represented by units encoding a target's location on trial t location (row) and on trial t À 1 (column). If one assumes the world is static, then the models amount to keeping a running frequency count. However, if one assumes the world is dynamic, activity in the representational units decays, such that there is a balance between more recent and more historic observations. searching in the presence of an unchanging spatial bias. Given this empirical observation of unchanging statistics and task instruction that target behaviour will not change, can we overcome the assumption that the world is dynamic in order to maximise performance? 2. Experiment 1 2.1. Methods
Participants
Ten undergraduates with normal or corrected to normal vision participated in the study for course credit. Participants searched in five blocks of 100 trials in 1 session each. Conditions (blocks) were run in a random order. No participants were excluded from analysis.
Participants were informed that they must locate a target and that its location may be guided by a hidden rule. They were told that this rule was probabilistic, so it is impossible to predict the targets location with complete certainty even if they correctly guessed the underlying rules. In contrast to Nummela, Lovejoy, and Krauzlis (2008), explicitly understanding of the rule was not assessed. Participants were instructed to do their best to predict where the target would appear next and to attempt to explore the locations in order of most likely to less likely. Importantly, they were informed that during an experimental blocks, the rule did not change.
Equipment
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor with resolution set to 1280 Â 1024 and refresh rate of 85 Hz. The room was held in constant dim lighting conditions. A chin-rest resulted in a stable viewing distance of $63.5 cm. An SR Research Eyelink 1000 eye tracker was used to track the position of the right eye. A 9-point calibration procedure was used at the start of each experimental block: calibration was repeated if a spatial accuracy worse than ±0.5°w as obtained. Default parameters were used in the saccade and fixation detection algorithm provided by SR Research.
Stimuli and procedure
People first had a practice session of 50 trials where the target location was unpredictable (condition 1). The data recorded from this practice session was discarded. The experiment consisted of 5 blocks, 1 of each condition, conducted in a randomised order for each participant. Fig. 2 shows the trial structure. Each trial started with a requirement to fixate a central point. One and a half seconds later, this point disappeared and four white squares (1°h eight and width) appeared along the screen diagonals, 7°from screen centre. People then were free to visually search the display: when the participant's fixation position was within 2°of one of the four placeholders, the contents of that location was revealed. If a distracter location was being fixated, that placeholder square turned red, and only turned back to white after the gaze position left the threshold distance. If fixation was within threshold distance of the target, the white placeholder turned green and a sound was played to indicate successfully finding the target. The target remained green for 1.5 s to aid short term memory of the target's location on that trial. After this time, the screen was blanked, leaving only a central fixation blob, ready for the next trial to begin.
Experimental conditions
A Markov chain was used to determine the target's location over time. This Markov chain had four states that represented each of the four possible spatial locations that the target could occupy. The initial location of a target in the first trial was chosen uniformly randomly, and the target then subsequently had a probability of p ij = P(x t = jjx tÀ1 = i) from moving from location i to location j. These transition probabilities p were defined for each condition as shown in Fig. 2b . Over each block of 100 trials, the target locations were defined as x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 100 .
Condition 1 had entirely random, unpredictable target location behaviour in order to measure people's default search behaviour. Based on previous findings it is predicted that people will display a bias to reinspect previous target locations.
If transient facilitation was the result of a hard-wired, nonadaptive mechanism, target location reinspections would persist regardless of the environmental statistics. So in condition 2, targets never repeated their location, and in condition 3 targets repeated on 50% of trials (twice chance levels of 25%). This will distinguish between a hard-wired vs. an adaptive mechanism underlying occulomotor prediction.
In condition 4, targets exhibit a spatial bias to appear on one side of the screen 80% of the time. By examining exploration behaviour conditional upon previous target location, we can see to what extent transient facilitation (location priming) is responsible.
Condition 5 is akin to the manipulations by Walthew and Gilchrist (2006) and Nummela, Lovejoy, and Krauzlis (2008) : Targets still have an overall spatial bias (occurring on one side of the screen 80% of the time) but targets never repeat their previous location. This allows one to separate any effects of adapting to the statistical structure of the environment (which requires learning 2nd order statistics) from location repetitions.
Conditions 4 and 5 had an 80:20 spatial bias to one side of the screen. The high probability side was randomised for each subject, but was taken into account in the analysis such that location 1 and 2 represent the high probability locations.
Analyses
An exploration sequence was determined for each search trial. Saccade landing positions within 2°radius of an item was counted as an exploration. Multiple consecutive explorations of the same location were collapsed to a single exploration. Any saccade landing outside of the 2°threshold did not contribute to the exploration sequence. Initial central fixation was removed leaving the first entry in the exploration sequence as the first location actively explored by the participant.
People's search behaviour was quantified into a first exploration matrix, f i,j which was defined as the number of times that a target was previously in location i, followed by a first exploration in location j. This measure could then be compared to first explored locations produced by either the probabilistic or the mechanistic models described below. This measure aims to capture the location in which participants think the target is most likely to occur in.
The first exploration matrix does not capture how search may unfold in cases where the target was not located on the first exploration. A simple search profile was calculated, capturing the proportion of trials in which either 1, 2, 3, or 4 explorations were required to locate the target.
Models
Four models were examined, see Fig. 1 . Each model was exposed to a series of 100 trials (as were the participants) where the target locations x were sampled from the transition probabilities p. The models have a number of units with a level of activity, q. For the 1st order models there were four internal units, and the 2nd order models had 16 units representing each possible transition. The models assuming the world was static was updated using Eq. (2) where k is fixed at zero. This amounts to these models keeping a running frequency count of each location or frequency. The models assuming the world was dynamic were updated using Eq.
(1) where k was a free parameter. At the start of each simulated search block, model activities were initialised as zero, representing no prior information or assumptions about the environmental statistics. The models explored each location in descending order of unit activations, and where appropriate (for the 2nd order models) it was assumed that the model always correctly remembered the target's previous location.
The model predictions resulted in an exploration order of all 4 item locations for each trial such that the first exploration metric could be compared to that of the models. In order to obtain average model predictions (not parochial to one individual target location sequence) this was repeated 50,000 times per condition.
The static models have no free parameters, whereas the dynamic models have 1 free parameter, the leak rate which was assessed over the range 0 6 k < 1. The model predictions presented of dynamic models were those corresponding to the maximum likelihood leak rate. The log likelihood of the parameters given the data is calculated using the multinomial distribution, summing likelihoods over each location and previous target location, j
This compares the first fixation counts f to set of model predictions expressed as proportions. These predictions m ij were defined as the proportion of times a model first explored location j when the target was in location i on the previous trial. Fig. 3 shows first exploration behaviour (points and 95% confidence intervals) for each condition. These are also compared to model predictions (grey bars). In condition 1, people demonstrated slight transient facilitation in that they were more likely to first explore the target's location on the previous trial. The fact that this is not adaptive, as targets are unpredictable, is consistent with the findings of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) . In condition 2, targets never repeated their previous location, and people exhibited transient inhibition, or negative location priming. In condition 3, targets repeated their location on 50% of trials and people exhibited a higher level of transient facilitation than in condition 1. In condition 4, people's first explorations were more adaptive if the target was previously on the high probability side: they showed transient facilitation and a generally higher total probability of first exploring the high probability side. If the target was previously on the low probability side, exploration behaviour was mixed, but with a subtle indication of remaining transient facilitation. Transient facilitation however was not present in condition 5 where targets never repeated their previous location (just as in condition 2). Instead, there was a high chance that people would first explore the high probability side, regardless of the target's previous location.
Results

Exploration behaviour and model predictions
Examining the model predictions (Fig. 3 , grey bars), shows that all models predict a degree of transient facilitation in conditions 1 and 3. Models that represent transitions predicted the transient inhibition, however the 2nd order static model predicted zero 'look-backs' and the 2nd order dynamic model accurately captured the partial transient inhibition that people exhibited. In conditions 4 and 5 the 1st order models provided poor qualitative fits to people's exploration behaviour. Fig. 4 (top) shows quantitative evaluation of the models. Each model was evaluated in terms of a likelihood measure (see Methods), but because the models with the static assumption have 0 parameters while the dynamic models have 1 parameter, the likelihood score was transformed using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC measure), defined as AIC = 2k À 2 ln(L), where L is the likelihood and k is the number of free parameters (Akaike, 1974 , Burnham & Anderson, 2004 . This AIC measure penalises models with more parameters and so the model fits can be compared even though they have different numbers of parameters. The AIC values shown in Fig. 4 have been normalised relative to a control model that explores uniformly randomly. Therefore models with negative scores account for people's first exploration behaviour better than chance, and the lower the AIC value the better. There is variation in model fits, for example all models are better than chance as explanations for search in condition 3, but only 1 model is better than chance in condition 5. The most important result is that the only model that is (a) consistently better than chance, and (b) comes first or joint first place, is the model that represents 2nd order statistics and that assumes the world is dynamic.
Quantitative model evaluation
Experiment 2
While the results of Experiment 1 indicate that we can learn 2nd order statistics, and that we do assume the world is dynamic, Experiment 2 saught to explore this further. More specifically, is it possible for people to maximise exploration performance by assuming the world is stationary when they are (a) informed that it is unchanging, and (b) when they have first hand observations of the unchanging rule over nearly 1 h of exploration time. If people can treat the world as static then they should be able to quickly learn to always visit the high probability locations first (see dashed blue lines in Fig. 5) . But if not, simulations predict that first explorations to high probability locations should increase to a steady state between 80% and 100% of the time.
Methods
Seven participants were run in five consecutive blocks of 100 trials, none were excluded from analysis. Instructions to the participants were identical to Experiment 1 with one exception. They were informed that the rule governing target behaviour would remain the same throughout the entire experiment. They were not informed what this behaviour would be, but they were exposed to condition 4 (an 80:20 spatial bias) over all blocks.
Results
Model evaluation
Model fits (Fig. 4 , bottom) again vary in their ability to account for people's exploration behaviour, but a number of important points emerge. The 2nd order dynamic model was again the only model that could account for search behaviour better than a control model over all subjects. However, subjects 1, 2, 5, and 6 were best fit by the 1st order dynamic model. So the results of Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent in their support for people assuming the world is dy- namic. However, it seems that some people potentially represented spatial locations while some represented transitions. Fig. 5 shows an analysis of search over all five blocks. The measure used was the proportion of first explorations that were directed to one of the high probability locations. The dashed blue line shows the 20-trial moving average of the 1st order static model exposed to the exact same target sequence that the participants saw. If people behaved according to this model, then they should be able to rapidly learn to always visit of the high probability locations first. However while some of the participants did so often, none managed to do this all of the time. Solid black lines show the 20-trial moving average of the observer's behaviour. Grey lines and shaded grey regions show mean and 95% confidence intervals of the proportion for each block.
Exploration over time
Based on other simulations, on average the models should rapidly reach between 80% and 100% first explorations to the high probability side. Anything below this is was not explicable in terms of this model.
The key point here is that none of the participants consistently always looked at the high probability region first, and so there is not much support for the idea that these subjects, under these conditions, managed to override their assumption that the world was dynamic.
General discussion
Combining predictions and observations
In order to focus upon the nature in which top-down predictions are made based upon previous target locations it is necessary to avoid confounds from the feature properties of targets and distracters. It is known from visual priming experiments that the feature identity of targets and distracters, and location interact in complex ways (Campana & Casco, 2009; Hillstrom, 2000; Huang, Holcombe, & Pashler, 2004; Kristjansson & Driver, 2008; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994 , 1996 McBride, Leonards, & Gilchrist, 2008) . The gaze contingent search task used here excluded visual cues from contributing at the start of search and only played a role as items were fixed (see Fig. 2 ). This slightly decreases the ecological validity, but any adaptive oculomotor search behaviours can be attributed exclusively to the past location of targets and the statistical rules governing their behaviour. The results presented are not sufficient to show that these predictions could have been combined with visual evidence had it been available. However, it seems entirely plausible as Liston and Stone (2008) did find this to be the case. It was also found in a covert search paradigm that visual evidence was able to be combined in a near-optimal manner with spatial predictions (Vincent, 2011) . This does not imply that the same holds for overt search however.
People adapt their occulomotor exploration to the statistics of the environment
Participants in Experiment 1 searched in a manner indicating that they were able to learn both 1st and 2nd order statistics that governed target location behaviour and search in an adaptive manner even within very short search blocks of 100 trials. People's default behaviour in an unpredictable environment was one of transient facilitation, consistent with Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) . This transient facilitation was amplified when targets repeated their location 50% of the time (condition 3) but was reversed (showing transient inhibition) when targets never repeated their location (condition 2). When there is a spatial bias (condition 4) people explored high probability locations first and there was somewhat of a transient repetition effect. However, when there was an identical spatial bias but no location repeats (condition 5), it was clear that search prioritised the non-repeating high probability location: a result that could not have been explained by transient facilitation. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that we can adapt to the prevailing statistics of the environment (Anderson & Carpenter, 2006; Druker & Anderson, 2010; Farrell et al., 2009; Geng & Behrmann, 2005; Jones & Kaschak, 2012; Miller, 1988; Nummela, Lovejoy, & Krauzlis, 2008; Shaw & Shaw, 1977) .
1st vs. 2nd order statistics
In Experiment 1, the model which was able to learn 2nd order statistics was the best, most robust account of human exploration behaviour over all conditions (see Fig. 4a ). These results support previous findings that we can learn transition probabilities in a between-trial context (Nummela, Lovejoy, & Krauzlis, 2008) or a within-trial context (Farrell et al., 2009) . In Experiment 2, the results are less clear cut: Fig. 4b shows that some people act as if they are just learning 1st order statistics and some act as if they learn 2nd order statistics. This may be a false distinction however. Learning the 2nd order statistics also captures the 1st order statistics. However, doing so requires the estimation of 16 transition probabilities as opposed to only 4 spatial probabilities. So a sensible strategy would be to simultaneously track both 1st and 2nd order statistics (see Wilder, Jones, & Mozer, 2009; Yu & Cohen, 2009 ).
Belief in a constant vs. a changing world
In Experiment 1, it was clear that the best account of exploration behaviour was given by a model that assumes the world is dynamic. This assumption means that information from the past is gradually forgotten in favour of new information. Clearly this is useful if the world is actually dynamic (Anderson & Carpenter, 2006) , but results in suboptimal performance if the world is actually unchanging. This is simply because if old information decays then one simply has a smaller sample size from which to calculate long run relative frequencies.
Are we constrained to make suboptimal predictions in static environments? Experiment 2 tested to see if we could overcome the dynamic world assumption if people were told the statistics underlying target behaviour does not change, and through direct experience of searching in a static world. Fig. 4b shows that across seven subjects, the models that account for exploration the best are those that assume the world is dynamic. Fig. 5 also shows that, under the conditions tested, all observers failed to explore in a manner consistent with assuming the world was static. These results certainly do not prove that it is impossible, but it did not happen despite task instruction and nearly 1 h worth of searching.
This may have implications for optimal observer modelling. One reason why suboptimal learning may be observed (e.g. Droll, Abbey, & Eckstein, 2009 ) is because we are suboptimal for experimental situations with unchanging statistics and are instead optimised to a dynamic changing world.
Insights into transient facilitation
Experiment 1 showed that transient facilitation seemed to be a default strategy. This was amplified when it was appropriate (condition 3) and attenuated when targets never repeated their previous location (conditions 2 and 5). Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) . Time-course of exploration behaviour in Experiment 2. Over five blocks of an 80:20 probability bias (condition 4) solid black lines show the 20-trial moving average of the proportion of first explorations to the a high probability location. This measure for the predictions of the 1st order static model is shown in the dashed blue line. None of the subjects were able to consistently always explore the high probability region first. Grey lines and shaded regions show means and 95% confidence intervals for each block.
proposed that this could be the result of a resistor-capacitor model, that causes transient facilitation which is useful in some realworld search situations. It is interesting to reinterpret transient facilitation in the light of the approach of Anderson and Carpenter (2006) who describe a very similar model (a leaky integrator) framed in terms of our beliefs of how changeable the world is. Fig. 6 shows the results of the location only, dynamic model to 50,000 simulated blocks of random target movement behaviour (condition 1). Plotted are the prior probabilities (activations q, transformed by the softmax operation) of the target to repeat its location n trials back in the past. This was done using Eq.
(1) for a range of k parameters. As the leak rate increases (discounting the past more rapidly) the transient facilitation effect increases in magnitude and decreases in duration. While this result could be argued to simply provide quantitative support to the predictions of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) , I would argue that combining it with the insights of Anderson and Carpenter (2006) allows one to explain transient facilitation not as the result of an arbitrary heuristic mechanism, but as a by-product of assuming the world is changeable.
Conclusion
People conducted a gaze contingent visual search task with no visual cues as to the target's location. This was only available once an item location was fixated, and the only way how search could become more efficient was for the participants to learn any underlying rules governing the targets location behaviour over time. Five different sets of statistical rules were examined with a mixture of 1st and 2nd order statistics. It was found that exploration behaviour of participants adapted to make search more efficient in all five search conditions. This suggests that people are able to learn both 1st and 2nd order statistics, supportive of previous findings. The present work strengthened this case by showing that exploration behaviour adapts to many different kinds of environmental statistics. This was further supported by the ability of a 2nd order model to account for people's exploration behaviour.
The results also suggest that people's internal predictive models make the assumption that the world is dynamic. This was shown both in Experiment 1 where a 2nd order dynamic model provided consistently good accounts of exploration behaviour, but a 2nd order static model did not. This assumption that the world is changeable may also account for some previously observed transient facilitatory effects. Experiment 2 also showed that, despite task instructions that the target statistics would not change and direct experience of searching in such a static environment for nearly 1 h, occulomotor predictions were unable to act as if they believed the environmental statistics were static. This has implications for optimal observer modelling of human behaviour: when we step into a simplified experimental procedure we may find it difficult to override assumptions that serve us well in a complex dynamic world. 
